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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20060045-CA

MARC CLIFTON BRYANT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction for assault by a prisoner, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004), in the
Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, Utah, the Honorable Eric A.
Ludlow presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West
2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue I: Did the trial court err when it admitted out-of-court statements
that were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted?
-1-

Standard of Review: This issue is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. "'Trial courts have wide discretion in deterrnining relevance, probative
value, and prejudice/" State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106,1 32, 61 P.3d 1019 (quoting State
v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 23, 25 P.3d 985). A reviewing court "'will not reverse the
trial court's ruling on evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so
abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted/" State v.
Gomez, 2002 UT 20, \ 12, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032,1035
(Utah 1987)).
Issue II: Did the trial court plainly err, or was counsel ineffective, in
allowing rebuttal testimony demonstrating that the defense witnesses were
biased against the victim?
Standard of Review: This issue is unpreserved. Therefore, no standard of
review applies.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following items are contained in Addendum A:
Utah R. Evid. 403;
Utah R. Evid. 404;
Utah R. Evid. 608;
Utah R. Evid. 801.

-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Information with assault by a prisoner, a third
degree felony (Rl). Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged
(R98). Defendant then filed a motion to arrest judgment (R115-125). Following a
hearing, the court denied the motion (R134-135). On January 3, 2006, defendant
was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the
Utah State prison (R146-150). Defendant timely appealed (R151-152).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Purgatory Correctional Facility had just locked down for the evening on
February 1, 2005, when defendant attacked his cellmate, Mack Harris
(R161:64-65, 67). Defendant kneed Harris in the groin, pinned him to the floor,
wrenched his arm around a metal stool, and punched his face repeatedly,
ignoring Harris's cries for him to stop (R161:69-74).
"He took his fists and launched out and hit me/'
Defendant and Harris had not been "getting along too weir7 since being
assigned as cellmates (R161:66). Both inmates had unsuccessfully requested
transfers to different cells (R161:114~15).

Harris reported that defendant

continuously asked him to give up the bottom bunk, which had been assigned to
Harris, but that Harris consistently refused (R161:66, 97). Harris surmised that
defendant had begun "trying to bully [him] out" of the cell "to take over the
-3-

bottom bunk." (R161:66). For instance, defendant regularly stepped on Harris's
desk and belongings in order to get into the top bunk, even though he could have
used his own desk for the same purpose (R161:66).
Just after lockdown on February 1, 2005, Harris was seated at his desk,
eating his dinner (R161:68). Defendant, seated on the top bunk, "swung his foot
around over [Harris's] plate where [he] was eating at to put his socks on."
(R161:68). When Harris asked defendant to cease changing his socks over his
dinner, defendant responded by "cussing at [Harris] and telling [him], you know
'F you,'" and that he "didn't want to hear that sh**/' (R161:68).
Harris noted that defendant had a "boiling point" and was "getting ready
to explode." (R161:68). Defendant leapt from the top bunk, "got in [Harris's]
face" and said, "'F you, what you want to do about it?'" (R161:69).

Harris

responded that he was "tired of [defendant] treating [him] like a bitch in here."
(R161:69). Defendant approached Harris's desk, "took his fists and launched out
and hit [Harris]." (R161:69). Harris explained: "He hit me in the back of the head
first, and then as I stood up to push him away, we was [sic] both tussling around
in the cell for him to get off me." (R161:69). After a few seconds of separation,
defendant lunged at him again (R161.70-71). Defendant attempted to wrestle
Harris to the floor, but was unable to do so (R161:73). He subsequently kneed
Harris in the groin, forced him to the ground, and resumed beating him
-4-

(R161:70, 73). Harris struggled toward his desk, but defendant seized one of his
arms, wedged it around the stool, which was bolted to the floor, and started
punching Harris in the face (R161:74-75). Harris cried, "Enough!" several times
while defendant pounded his face, but to no effect (R161:74). After defendant
finally quit beating him, Harris pulled himself up and pressed an intercom
button to call for assistance from corrections officers (R161:75).
"It looked like he had been hit by a truck/7
Corrections officers arrived and removed both defendant and Harris from
the cell (R161:76, 88, 101). As defendant was escorted out of the cellblock, he
began informing the other inmates in C block that Harris was "a rat" for calling
for help and telling them to "take care of [him]." (R161:76).

The inmates

immediately reacted. Officer Justin Seegmiller reported that "multiple inmates
in that cell block" began yelling at Harris, calling him a "F***ing rat." (R161:90).
Defendant, whose hands were bloody, was taken to medical where he was
treated for scrapes on his knuckles (R161:89, 108).

Harris gathered his

belongings, and was taken down to medical, where he was treated for black eyes,
cuts and abrasions on his face and arm, and a shattered elbow (R161:79~80).
Officer Seegmiller indicated that Harris's "face was all red. He was swollen. It
was - he looked like he had hit the pavement pretty hard." (R161:90). "It looked
like he had been hit by a truck." (R161:90).
-5-

"You better tell them that it was horseplay/7
After being treated in medical, Harris was placed in A block, where
defendant was also being held (R161:77). Defendant began yelling though the
cell block, "[N]o matter where you are or, you know, any time you go - if you go
to class or you do anything, I'm going to get you. You better tell them that it was
horseplay/ 7 (R161:78). Defendant told Harris to report the attack as horseplay
several times (R161:78).
Defendant reported to several officers that he and Harris had merely
engaged in horseplay in the cell. See (R161:88, 102,109) ("just adult horseplay"
and "no big deal") ("he basically described that he and his cell mate were horse
playing") ("He told me that he was involved in horseplay."). Defendant also told
Officer Seegmiller that the blood on his hand came from "picking pimples."
(R161:89).
However, the officers were immediately suspicious of defendant's
characterization. Officer Darrell McCoy felt that Harris's injuries were the result
of "more than just horse playing," and Officer Seegmiller noted that defendant's
injuries were "very minimal compared to Mack Harris'[s]." (R161:91, 103).
Defendant requested a witness statement form, but when Officer McCoy gave
him one, he tore it up, telling him that "he had forgotten what had happened."

-6-

(R161:103-04). This was within a "matter of minutes, no more than an hour"
after the incident (R161:104).
Trial
Harris did not report the attack as horseplay; instead, he reported the
assault to corrections officers. At trial, defendant called four inmates who were
also housed in C block at the time of the assault (R161:116,123,126,130). None
of the witnesses could see into defendant and Harris's cell.
Jared Eskelsen reported that he heard Harris call defendant a "bitch" and
heard defendant say, "Don't hit me, Mack," before the altercation occurred
(R161:118-19).

He denied hearing Harris call for help from the corrections

officers, and said that he did not hear any of the inmates yelling at Harris after he
was taken from the cell (R161:121-22).
The other defense witnesses stated that Harris was "touchy-feely" with
people, and would intentionally annoy defendant. See (R161:124, 128, 131).
However, two witnesses stated that they had never seen violent behavior or
blows struck between Harris and defendant (R161:125, 128). Only Brian Bogart
testified that Harris often pushed defendant around (R161:131).
In rebuttal, the prosecution recalled Harris, who testified that he never had
contact with defendant outside of his cell because defendant was in a different
"clique" from Harris (R161:137). He explained that he never had contact with
-7-

defendant in the day room "because [defendant] was always over, as they call it,
[with] their white supremacist group." (R161:137).
Harris, who is black, testified that Bogart had "Aryan or supremacist
tattoos" (R161:137). He also testified that "they all look up to" Bogart. "He's
supposed to be Mr. Penitentiary, and they all look up to him." (R161137). When
asked if any of them had ever made racial comments to him, Harris testified that
Bogart had called him a "f***ing nig***" (Rl61:138). He also testified that both
Bogart and Eskelsen had called him a "f***ing rat" after he called for help on the
intercom (R16V.138).
Defense counsel did not immediately object to the testimony regarding
white supremacy (R161:137-38). However, he objected following the testimony
that they had called Harris a "f***ing rat," arguing that the testimony was
hearsay, "removed from any rebuttal evidence," "totally speculative," and that
there was "no talk about racism" on direct (R161:138-39).
The prosecutor argued that it was direct impeachment of the witnesses
(R161:139). Defense counsel argued that the prosecution was "introducing a
whole new line of issues that are not relevant" and was taking off "into this flight
of fancy about a white supremacist group." (R161:139).

-8-

The prosecutor

responded by stating that it showed "bias and (inaudible)/7 (R161:139).a The
court overruled the objection (R161:139).
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from Harris that
he had a "black pride tattoo/7 (R161:140). Defense counsel also had Harris
describe Bogart's tattoo, which Harris said was "a dagger on the back of his leg/7
(R161:140).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's argument that Harris's rebuttal testimony constituted hearsay
is inadequately briefed, and should be disregarded by the Court. Even on the
merits, Harris's rebuttal testimony was largely non-hearsay because it was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
Defendant also argues that Harris's rebuttal testimony was inadmissible
because it was character evidence precluded by rule 404(b), and should also have
been precluded under rule 403 because its probative value was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. Defendant's 404 and 403 claims are unpreserved, and should
only be reviewed for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The

evidence was not precluded under rule 404(b) because it was offered for a

1

During the hearing on the motion to arrest judgment, the prosecutor argued
that the testimony was impeachment, and that it was not "going to the
fundamental issue of whether or not that individual was in fact a white
supremacist." (R162:6-7). He also argued that it "goes directly to 608(c) under
bias." (R162:7).
-9-

proper, noncharacter purpose under rule 608 to show bias, prejudice, and motive
to misrepresent.
In any event, any error in allowing testimony regarding the racist views of
defense witnesses was harmless. The physical evidence and other testimony
overwhelmingly supported Harris's version of the assault.

In addition, the

credibility of the defense witnesses was already put in question by contradictory
testimony from correctional officers.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT ADMITTED
HARRIS'S REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.

Defendant alleges that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to
present Harris's rebuttal testimony (Aplt. br. at 2). Specifically, he asserts that
the testimony was inadmissible because: 1) it was hearsay; 2) it was not
admissible for an appropriate noncharacter purpose under rule 404(b); and 3) it
was not admissible under rule 403 because the testimony was remote and
speculative, and the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its
probative value (Aplt. br. at 18).
Defendant asserts that these issues were preserved in an objection raised at
trial and in the motion to arrest judgement, but if not preserved, should be
reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel (Aplt. br. at 2).

-10-

A.

Harris's rebuttal testimony was not hearsay because the
statements were not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted.

Defendant asserts that "the testimony concerning what Bogart told Harris
about his tattoo, and the fact that Bogart called Harris a 'f-ing nig***/is hearsay/7
(Aplt. br. at 18). However, defendant never engages in any analysis of his
hearsay argument. This argument is therefore inadequately briefed and should
be disregarded by the Court.2 But even on the merits, this claim fails because the
challenged statements were either non-hearsay because they were not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted, or were elicited by defendant on crossexamination.
Defendant asserts that "[essentially Harrises] testimony on rebuttal is that
none of the defense witnesses should be believed because they are all part of a
white supremacist group," which "was based solely on a tattoo of a dagger
belonging to one of the defense witnesses (Bogart), a conversation between

2

Under Rule 24 of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant must
submit a brief containing "reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal
authority." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 P.3d 138. "An issue is
inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." Id. When a
defendant's brief "fails to cite relevant authority or provide any meaningful
analysis" regarding the issue presented, "[tjhis court has routinely declined to
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." State v.
Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, Tf 27,989 P.2d 503 (citing Burns v. Summerhays, 927
P.2d 197,199 (Utah App. 1996)).
-11-

Harris and that witness that the tattoo was 'some kind of anti-anarchy' thing, and
the fact that Bogart [sic]."3 (Aplt. br. at 18).
When viewed in context, the record demonstrates that Harris's rebuttal
testimony impeached the defense witnesses based upon their association with
defendant in a white supremacist group, their association with Bogart, and
Bogart's racist conduct against Harris.
Harris testified in the State's case in chief (R161:64-85).

In response,

defendant called four inmates to testify concerning the relationship between
Harris and defendant. They testified that Harris was always "touchy-feely," that
he was "often putting his hands on other people," and that defendant and Harris
were "getting on each other's nerves" (R161:124, 127-131). Bogart testified that
he witnessed Harries repeatedly pushing defendant around, and specifically
denied calling Harris a "f***ing rat" (R161:131,133).
In response to this testimony, the State recalled Harris as a rebuttal
witness, with no objection from defendant (R161:136-41) (addendum B). Harris
explained that he was not "touchy-feely" with defendant. He testified that he
and defendant "would never have any communication in the day room because
[defendant] was always over [with], as they call it, their white supremacist
group." (R161:137).

3

The end of this sentence is missing from appellant's brief.
-12-

Harris explained that all of the defense witnesses associated with
defendant in the day room ("Mr. Rupp, Mr. Brian Bogart, and also the other
gentlemen/7) (R161:137). He elaborated: "Every time we would come in from
lock down, that was their clique. They would always clique up together in the
day room, and they would - - like I say, if they was doing their work out to
playing cards or whatever they was doing, but they would all be in their little
inner circle together/' (R161:137).
When asked whether any of the witnesses had made racial comments to
him, Harris testified that Bogart had called him a "f***ing nig***" when he had
refused to give up his commissary to Bogart (R161:138).
Rule 801 defines hearsay as "[1] a statement, [2] other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, [3] offered into evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). The statements
made by Harris in rebuttal were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,
and are thus non-hearsay.
Presumably, defendant objects to the following statements made by Harris
as hearsay: (1) " . . . as they call it, their white supremacist group"; (2) "He was
like, "You f***ing nig***'"; and (3) ".. . he said it was some kind of anti-anarchy or

-13-

something like that

" (R161:137,138,140-41).4 The first two statements were

not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and are thus non-hearsay. "When
an out-of-court statement is offered simply to prove that it was made, without
regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay
rule/ 7 State v. Sorensen, 617 R2d 333, 337 (Utah 1980). "Testimony of this nature
does not violate the hearsay rule since the witness is asserting under oath a fact
he personally knows, that is, that the statement was made/ 7 State v. Sibert, 310
P.2d 388,391 (Utah 1957).
The first two statements were not offered for their truth - that is, they were
not offered to prove that in fact Harris was a f***ing nig***, or that it was in fact a
white supremacist group. The statements were offered simply to prove that they
were made, not for their truth. They were offered to support Harris's belief that
the defense witnesses were biased against him. Therefore, they are non-hearsay,
and the court did not err in overruling defendant's belated objection.
B.

One of Harris's rebuttal statements was elicited by defense
counsel and was therefore invited error.

The third statement regarding Bogart's explanation of the meaning of his
tattoo was not elicited by the State, but by defendant's cross-examination of
Harris:
4

Defendant did not object to any of these individual questions or answers,
but objected to the line of questioning after the prosecution had moved on to
another incident. See (Rl61:136-39).
-14-

Defense counsel: What is the tattoo that is a white supremacist tattoo
that you're talking about? What does it say?
Harris: He's got a dagger on the back of his leg that he said it was
some kind of anti-anarchy or something like that, but he's got it on
the back of his calf on his leg.
Defense Counsel: It doesn't say, "Kill nig***s," it doesn't say, "White
supremacist," it's a dagger on his leg.
Harris: No, it's the comments that come out of Mr. Bogart's mouth.
(R161:140-41).
Defendant made no objection to Harris's answers. When "the testimony
complained of [is] initially elicited by defense counsel's cross-examination [], any
error [is] invited. 'We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error.'" State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, If 33, 72 P.3d 127
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1220 (Utah 1993)).
If defendant found Harris's answers objectionable, he should have raised
an objection. Because Bogart's statements regarding the meaning of the tattoo
were invited by defendant, their admission was invited error, and should not be
considered by this Court.

-15-

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR AND TRIAL COUNSEL
WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN ALLOWING REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
DEMONSTRATING WITNESS BIAS
A.

There was no plain error or ineffective assistance

Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it allowed rebuttal
testimony concerning prior bad acts or conduct of a witness in violation of 404(b)
(Aplt br. at 18). However, defendant never raised this objection during trial.
Under Utah's preservation rule, "'a contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court
record before an appellate court will review such claim[s]/" State v. Johnson, 774.
P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987)). In addition, the objection below must be "specific enough to give the trial
court notice of the very error .. . complained of." Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water
Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted).
In this case, the victim, Mr. Harris, testified in the State's case in chief
(R161:64-85). Following the defense case, the State re-called Mr. Harris as a
rebuttal witness (R161:136). Defendant did not object to Mr. Harris being called
as a rebuttal witness. However, part-way into Mr. Harris's rebuttal testimony,
the defense objected to certain testimony, asserting that it was hearsay (R161:138139). The court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony (R161:139).

-16-

Defendant renewed his hearsay objection in his motion to arrest judgment, and
raised, for the first time, an objection based on Rule 702 (R123).5
On appeal, defendant has abandoned his rule 702 objection, and instead
argues for the first time that the testimony was inadmissible because it was
character evidence precluded by rule 404(b) (Aplt. br. at 13, 18 & 23). This
objection was never raised in the trial court. Accordingly, defendant argues that
the issue may be reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel
(Aplt. br. at 2 & 13).
To establish plain error, defendant must show: "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful,
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
for the appellant

" State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ 16,122 P.3d 543 (quotations

and citation omitted). In this case, no error occurred, let alone obvious error, and
even if error did occur, it was harmless. Moreover, defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to object to the testimony, because it was admissible.
"[T]he failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance/' State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,
1f34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations omitted).

5

Defendant claimed that Harris was testifying as an expert as to what certain
tattoos meant, and argued that no foundation had been laid for Harris's
knowledge (R123).
-17-

B.

Harris's rebuttal testimony was not precluded by rule 404(b),
because it was offered for a proper non-character purpose

Utah's rule of evidence 404(b) states that "[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith/' Defendant asserts that there is no proper
non-character purpose for which Harris's rebuttal testimony could be offered,
and it was therefore inadmissible (Aplt. br. at 19).

However, the rebuttal

testimony defendant objects to was not evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts,
and was not offered to prove character. It was rebuttal testimony, consisting of
statements heard by Harris, and a tattoo seen by Harris. It was offered as
evidence of bias or prejudice to impeach the defense witnesses.
At trial, defendant did not raise a rule 404(b) objection. The trial court did
not plainly err by failing to sua sponte raise a 404(b) objection for the defendant.6
Nor was defense counsel ineffective for not raising a 404(b) objection, because the
testimony did not violate rule 404(b). Counsel was not ineffective for not making
a futile objection. Whittle, 1999 UT 96 at Tf34.

6

Defendant argues that the court's error in failing to sua sponte engage in a 404(b)
analysis was obvious because the law clearly requires a three-step analysis (Aplt.
br. at 23-24). However, the error complained of is not that the court failed to
engage in a proper 404(b) analysis, but that it failed to engage in any 404(b)
analysis. The fact that controlling law dictates the method to resolve a 404(b)
objection is irrelevant. In order to establish obvious error, defendant must
demonstrate that the court should have known that it was required to interrupt
Harris's testimony and raise a 404(b) objection for defendant.
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C.

Harris's rebuttal testimony was properly admitted under
rule 608 to show bias, prejudice, and motive to misrepresent.

The rebuttal testimony was "actually being offered for a proper,
noncharacter purpose." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, Tf21, 993 P.2d 837. The
testimony was offered as impeachment evidence of bias, prejudice, or motive to
misrepresent. The testimony was admissible under rule of evidence 608, which
allows "[ejvidence of bias. Bias, prejudice, or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced." Utah R. Evid. 608(c) (emphasis added). Harris's testimony
constituted evidence "otherwise adduced" to impeach the defense witnesses. See
(R161:136-41) (addendum B).7
"[Ejvidence of bias or motive is 'always relevant as discrediting the
witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.'" State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d
200, 203 (Utah 1987) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)) (additional
citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Harris's rebuttal
testimony was permissible to introduce evidence of bias and motive on the part
of the defense witnesses.

Their close association with defendant in a group

sharing ideological goals demonstrates a strong connection between defendant
7

In addition, even under Rule 404, "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:... (3) Character of witness. Evidence
of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609." Utah R.
Evid. 404(a)(3).
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and his witnesses. Such a connection evidences motive to misrepresent, affecting
the weight of their testimony. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1984)
(holding that trial court did not err by allowing evidence of defendant and
witness's membership in Aryan Brotherhood, and explaining that "[a] witness7
and party's common membership in an organization, even without proof that the
witness or party has personally adopted its tenets, is certainly probative of bias");
see also Hackford, 737 P.2d at 203 (citing Abel).
In addition, their calling themselves a "white supremacist group"
demonstrated a potential for bias against Harris, who is black. Thus, race was
not introduced as a means of unfairly prejudicing defendant, but of
demonstrating bias and motive to misrepresent under Utah Rule of Evidence
608(c). See Hackford, 737 P.2d at 203 ("[I]f a prior instance of conduct is relevant
to a witness' bias or motive to testify differently than would otherwise be the
case, evidence pertaining to that conduct is not subject to exclusion under Rule
608(b).") (citation omitted).

The testimony was admissible for a proper,

noncharacter purpose and therefore rule 404(b) does not apply.
D.

Harris's rebuttal testimony was admissible under rule 403.

Defendant alleges that Harris' rebuttal testimony was inadmissible under
evidence rule 403, because the probative value of the testimony was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (Aplt. br. at 19). Like defendant's
-20-

404(b) claim, his 403 objection was never raised in the trial court. Accordingly,
the issue may be reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel
(Aplt. br. at 2 & 13).
Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence/' Utah R.
Evid. 403.
Defendant argues that Harris's rebuttal testimony was remote and
speculative (Aplt. br. at 18).

Defendant concedes that "the remoteness of

evidence does not render it irrelevant/' but asserts that "it may, however, reduce
its probative value." (Aplt. br. at 19). The record is unclear as to whether the
evidence was remote. Nevertheless, even if remote, the evidence was admissible
because it was highly probative in demonstrating the racial bias of Bogart, and
the bias of the other defense witnesses based upon their association with
defendant and Bogart in "as they call it, their white supremacist group."
(R161:137).
Defendant has provided no legal analysis of why Harris's statements were
speculative, and therefore the argument should be disregarded.8 In any case,
8

When a defendant's brief "fails to cite relevant authority or provide any
meaningful analysis" regarding the issue presented, "[t]his court has routinely
declined to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal."
-21-

Harris did not speculate - he testified about things he heard and saw. His
testimony was highly probative in demonstrating possible bias, prejudice, or
motive to misrepresent. Because of their membership in a white supremacist
group, the defense witnesses may have had a racial bias or prejudice against
Harris, and may have had a motive to misrepresent. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 53
("[The defense witness and defendant's] membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
was not offered to convict either of a crime, but to impeach [the witness's]
testimony.").
Defendant argues that Harris's rebuttal testimony was inadmissible under
rule 403 because "[p]rior to the rebuttal testimony, no mention of race had been
made during trial/7 (Aplt. br. at 21). Defendant also asserts that the rebuttal
testimony was inadmissible under rule 403 because it concerned only Bogart, and
had no direct connection with defendant or the other defense witnesses (Aplt. br.
at 19).

Defendant therefore contends that the danger of unfair prejudice

substantially outweighed probative value.
The fact that the issue of race was not raised earlier is irrelevant, because
the complained of testimony was offered in rebuttal as impeachment of the
defense witnesses. In addition, the fact that specific racist acts and words were

State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 27, 989 P.2d 503 (citing Burns v. Summerhays,
927 R2d 197,199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
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only attributable to Bogart did not unfairly prejudice the jury against the
defendant and the other defense witnesses. Harris specifically stated that all of
the witnesses belonged to "as they call it, their white supremacist group/ 7
(R161:137). He also testified that the members of the group looked up to Bogart
as their leader, and then related specific instances of Bogart7 s racist conduct
(R161:137-38). Thus, the testimony did not solely address "conduct by one
witness/7 (Aplt. br. at 22).

Rather, Harris testified that all of the defense

witnesses were in the same "clique,77 "as they call it, their white supremacist
group/ 7 (R161.-137).
Harris provided evidence of bias or prejudice and motive to misrepresent
in each witness based upon their association with defendant and Bogart in a
white supremacist group. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 52-53. The fact that specific racist
acts and words were only attributable to Bogart did not unfairly prejudice the
jury against the other defense witnesses. Indeed, defendant could have recalled
his witnesses in order to refute Harris's allegations of their membership in a
white supremacist group, but he did not.
"'Trial courts have wide discretion in determining relevance, probative
value, and prejudice/77 State v. Kelt, 2002 UT 106, \ 32, 61 P.3d 1019 (quoting State
v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, f 23, 25 P.3d 985). "To find that an error has been made in
admitting evidence in the face of a rule 403 objection, we must conclude that the
-23-

trial court abused its discretion in permitting the challenged evidence to be
received. Specifically, we must find that the ruling in favor of admissibility was
beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 404 (Utah
1994) (citing State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,239-40 (Utah 1992)).
Although the court did not make specific 403 findings on the record,9 there
is a basis in the record for the allowance of the rebuttal testimony in this case. See
State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987) ("[Ejven in the absence of such
findings, we will still affirm if we can find some basis in the record for
concluding that the trial court's action falls within the limits of permissible
discretion under Rule 403.") (citing State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438, 438 (Utah
1982)).
The probative value of the testimony was high. Defendant admits that the
case "turned on the credibility of Harris versus the credibility of the four defense
witnesses/7 (Aplt. br. at 19). Therefore, testimony attacking the credibility of the
defense witnesses, or providing evidence of bias, was highly probative.
"[E]vidence of bias or motive is "' always relevant as discrediting the witness and
affecting the weight of his testimony/"" Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987)
(citations omitted). In addition, the danger of unfair prejudice was reduced by
the other testimony and evidence presented at trial.
9

Because defendant did not raise this issue below, he did not seek 403
findings.
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The trial court did not plainly err by admitting the testimony
demonstrating the witnesses' bias, prejudice, and motive to misrepresent. Any
prejudicial effect did not outweigh its probative value, and the admission of the
evidence was not "beyond the limits of reasonability." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 404.
Ill

ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS
Even if the court committed error by admitting the rebuttal testimony, any

error was harmless in light of defense counsel's subsequent cross-examination of
Harris, and the other testimony and evidence presented at trial.
On cross-examination, defense counsel drew attention to Harris's "black
pride tattoo," referring to it as "black supremacist tattoos." (R161:140). He also
elicited testimony that Bogart's tattoo was merely a dagger on the back of his leg
(R161:140-41).
In addition, other trial testimony and the physical evidence corroborated
Harris's version of the assault, and the key defense witness's testimony conflicted
with the testimony of corrections officers. Harris described his beating in detail defendant hit him in the head and groin, pinned him to the ground, wrapped his
arm around the metal stool that was bolted to the floor, and then struck his face
repeatedly (R161:69-75). Harris's injuries corroborated his description of the
beating - his face was bruised and lacerated, and his elbow had been shattered
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(R161:79-80). In comparison, defendant's injuries consisted of scraped knuckles
(R161:89,108).
The testimony of Jared Eskelson directly contradicted Harris's testimony,
naming Harris as the instigator (R161:118~19). He testified that he could hear the
dialogue between Harris and defendant, but that he did not hear Harris call for
help on the intercom, and did not hear any inmates yelling at Harris after he was
removed from his cell (R161:121-22). Yet corrections officers confirmed that
Harris made the intercom call for help, and that multiple inmates were
screaming at Harris as they left C block (Rl61:76, 88, 90,101).
The other defense witnesses had neither seen nor heard the fight, but
testified that Harris regularly instigated physical contact with the defendant
(R161:124, 128, 131). However, Harris testified that he never had contact with
defendant outside of his cell because defendant was always with his "clique/' the
defense witnesses. (R161:137).
Additional evidence suggested that defendant was attempting to cover-up
his crime. He threatened Harris after they were placed in A block and told him
to report the attack as "horseplay," despite the extent of Harris's injuries
(Rl61:78). Defendant reported the fight as "horseplay" to corrections officers,
and then told an officer that he had "forgotten what had happened" shortly after
the incident (R161:88,102,103-04,109).
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In sum, the evidence corroborated Harris's testimony, and refuted
defendant's claims. Questions about the credibility of the defense witnesses
were raised by means other than the objected-to rebuttal testimony. Testimony
of the defense witnesses was contradicted by testimony from corrections officers.
In addition, the degree and nature of the victim's injuries and defendant's
behavior following the assault, supported defendant's guilt. Therefore, any error
in admitting Harris's rebuttal testimony was harmless.
"'Notwithstanding error by the trial court, we will not reverse a conviction
if we find that the error was harmless.'" State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ^f 28
(quoting State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 45, 55 P.3d 573). Therefore, this Court
should decline defendant's request to reverse his conviction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court
affirm defendant's conviction.
fid
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403
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WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

V
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Current with amendments effective November 1,2006
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404

C

WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS

F
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT;
EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused
and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the
prosecution;
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of
the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the
first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of
any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2006
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 608

C

WEST'S UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES

V

RULE 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS

(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as
to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the
accused's or the witness' privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only
to character for truthfulness.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by
examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2006
Copr © 2006 Thomson/West
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801

C
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
STATE COURT RULES
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY

W

RULE 801. DEFINITIONS

The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut
an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C)
one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement,
in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of
the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of
a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Current with amendments effective November 1, 2006
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Addendum B
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MR, CRAMER:

No other witnesses, your Honor.

At this

2 J time the defense rests.
3 I
4

THE COURT:

rebuttal witnesses at this time?

5 I
6

The defense having rested, Mr. Shaum, any

MR. SHAUM:

Your Honor, we'll call Mr. Harris again just

THE COURT:

Okay. Mr. Harris, again I will remind you

briefly.

7 I

8 I that you still are under oath, okay?
9

MR. HARRIS:

10
11
12 I
13

Yes, sir.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. SHAUM:
Q.

Mr. Harris, you've been here during the testimony of the

individuals called by the defense, correct?

14 I

A.

Yes, sir.

15 I

Q.

At least two of them talked about you being —

16

let's

see, Mr. Bogart said you were kind of touchy feely, and I think

17 I Mr. Rupp said that you were kind of a hands-on type of person.
18 J You'd pat him on the back or you pushed —
19

well, and they both

testified that you were hands on with the defendant.

Do you

20 I recall any time where you put your hands on the defendant in view
21
22

of anybody or at all?
A.

No, sir.

The only time I ever put my hands on

23

Mr. Bryant is to push him away from me and get him off of me.

24

These guys that testified said that we would come out of the cell

25

and I was down in the day room touchy feely, me and Mr. Bryant
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would never have any communication in the day room because

2

Mr. Bryant was always over, as they call it, their white

3

supremacist group.

4

the day room.

5

talking with one another, or you know, they just sitting there

6

maybe watching t.v. or playing pinochle or whatever.

They would all be over in a different part of

Either they will be working out or they will be

7

Q.

Who is they?

8

A.

As far as the individuals, Mr. Rupp, Mr. Brian Bogart,

9

and also the other gentlemen.

10
11

Q.

So these individuals actually associated with the

defendant when they had a chance?

12

A.

Oh, yeah.

Every time we would come in from lock down,

13

that was their clique.

14

the day room, and they would —

15

their work out to playing cards or whatever they was doing, but

16

they would all be in their little inner circle together.

17

Q.

They would always clique up together in
like I say, if they was doing

You mentioned something about —

you made a comment

18

about white supremacist group. What makes you believe that they

19

have some tendencies towards prejudices against blacks or any

20

other group?

21 I

A.

Well, for what it is, you can see the tatoos on

22

Mr. Bogart.

For another thing, they all look up to Mr. Bogart

23

as Mr. Penitentiary.

24

they all look up to him.

25

tattoos that Mr. Bogart also wears, too.

He's supposed to be Mr. Penitentiary, and
You can see the Aryan or supremacist
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2
3 J

Q.

Has any of them ever made any racial comments towards

A.

The only time —

you?

4 I to jail.

I was in A block when I first came back

Mr. Brian Bogart had called me a fucking nigger one

5 I time because I wouldn't give him some of my commissary.
6 I like, "You fucking nigger."
7 I anything like that.

He didn't get up in my face or say

He just made the reply.

8 J top tier, he was on the lower tier.
9

He was

I was the on the

He made the reply, ^vYou

fucking nigger," and then he just walked off.

I heard it, but I

10 J left it alone, you know.
11 I

Q.

Did you hear Mr. Bogart say anything on the C block

12

after Officer Seegmiller —

13

you about what had happened between you and Mr. Bryant?

14 I
15

A.

Deputy Seegmiller went in to talk to

It was not only Mr. Bogart, but it was also —

the first gentleman's name?

Mr. See

16

Q.

Jared Eskelsen?

17

A.

Yeah, Jared Eskelsen.

18 I it was —
19

what was

—

Between them two yelling, I mean,

like I said, it was all this, "You — " excuse me,

ladies, but was

—

20

MR. CRAMER:

Your Honor, I'm going to object.

21

THE WITNESS:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. CRAMER:

24

THE WITNESS:

25

THE COURT:

—

you fucking rat

—

Hold on.
This is so hearsay, this is so
No, I'm telling —

Hold on, Mr. Harris.

I'm

—

—
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2

MR. CRAMER:
evidence at all.

3 I up now.
4

This is so far removed from any rebuttal

It's just totally speculative.

He brings it

There's no talk about racism in his direct.

him there is no talk about it.

When I call

Suddenly there's talk of tattoos,

5 J and it's just completely.
6

THE COURT:

Mr. Shaum?

7 I

MR. SHAUM:

Your Honor, nobody asked about that, and

8 J this is direct impeachment of those witnesses.
9

Both Mr. Bogart,

number one, who testified he never said anything like that.

10

Number two, Mr. Eskelsen says he didn't recall the defendant

11

saying anything or that he —

12

THE COURT:

13 I

MR. CRAMER:

was he involved in any of that.

Thank you, Mr. Shaum.

Mr. Cramer?

Well, your Honor, just —

it's one thing

14 I to say no, I heard them say that on rebuttal, but now he's
15

introducing a whole new line of issues that are not relevant to

16

what was said.

He can stand up there and say no, I heard them

17 I say that, or no, they didn't say that.

But then to take off into

18

this flight of fancy about a white supremacist group, I think is

19

just

—

20

MR. SHAUM:

Well, it's bias and (inaudible).

21

THE COURT:

Any other record, Mr. Cramer?

22

MR. CRAMER:

23

THE COURT:

24

objection.

25

Q.

Nothing, your Honor.
The Court is going to overrule the

Go ahead, Mr. Shaum.

BY MR. SHAUM:

What did Mr. Bogart say, then, when

-1401 J Deputy Seegmiller went into the cell?
2 J

A.

After —

it was before Deputy Seegmiller and after

3

Deputy Seegmiller came in, it was Brian Bogart yelling right

4

there at this door, ^You F'ing rat.

5

You F'ing rat."

Then as

I they escorted me after I gathered all of my belongings out of

6 I the cell and I was walking down the steps to go out of the pod,
7

I that's when Brian Bogart said again, "You F'ing rat.

8
9

You F7ing

rat."
J

10

Q.

He's saying that?

Do you know why?

Did he tell you

why --

11 J

A.

Because Bryant —

Mr. Bryant had went down the pod and

12 I told them that I hit the button, that I had hit the intercom
13

button to call security.

14 I

MR. CRAMER:

15

THE COURT:

Sustained.

16

MR. SHAUM:

No further questions, your Honor.

17
18

Objection, your Honor, that's hearsay.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. CRAMER:

19

Q.

Do you want to show us your black supremacist tattoos?

20

A.

No, I don't have any black supremacist tattoos.

I've

21

got a black pride tattoo saying that I am proud to be a black

22

man, but I —

23 I
24
25

Q.

Okay.

it's not a supremacist thing.
What is the tattoo that is a white supremacist

tattoo that you're talking about?
A.

What does it say?

He's got a dagger on the back of his leg that he said it
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was some kind of anti-anarchy or something like that, but he's

2 I got it on the back of his calf on his leg.
3
4
5 I

Q.

It doesn't say, "Kill niggers," it doesn't say, "White

supremacist," it's a dagger on his leg.
A.

No, it's the comments that come out of Mr. Bogart's

6 J mouth.

Now you're

7 J

Well, you said it was a white supremacist tattoo, and

8

Q.

—

it's not, is it?

9

MR. SHAUM:

Your Honor, I object.

This is

10 I argumentative.
11 I

THE COURT:

Mr. Cramer, Mr. Cramer, settle down.

12

THE WITNESS:

13

THE COURT:

Like I said, he --

Hold on.

Hold on.

Hold on.

Mr. Cramer, do

14 I you have a question for the witness?
15
16
17

Q.

BY MR. CRAMER:

So the tattoo that you saw on his leg

was a dagger?
A.

What I seen on his leg and what he explained to me.

18 I We sat there at the day room table with Mr. Brian Bogart, and he
19 I turned around and told me and he explained to me what was that
20

tattoo for.

21

MR. CRAMER:

Nothing further, your Honor.

22

THE COURT:

Mr. Shaum?

23

MR. SHAUM:

No further questions.

24

THE COURT:

Ms. Harris, you can step down.

25 I Any other rebuttal witnesses?-

Thank you.

